When the country enters the board of directors: stake in Intel and "commission" NVIDIA s new American corporate governance model

NVIDIA (NVIDIA), AMD increased 15% of the sales of specific chips sold to China to the federal government. The company's shareholding and export supervision are two parallel tracks, and it has been put on the surface again due to Trump's strong practices - is the US's corporate governance principles being re-written by a new industrial policy named after national security?

How do U.S. usually deal with exports and companies?

Article 1, Section 9 of the US Act clearly stipulates that export taxes are not allowed to be paid to states; the Supreme Court also found in the 1998 "U.S. Shoe" case that it would be against the law that the Hong Kong fee for "export value" courses was taxed in violation of the law. This principle restricts the federal government's tax on the export sector, resulting in the tools they come to "regulation" and "permits" rather than taxes from exports.

Therefore, the "fees" of the United States in exports are usually administrative management, mainly cost-oriented. For example, the DDTC (ITAR) that the State Council is responsible for military-operated management adopts an annual fee classification system. After adjustments from the end of 2024 to 2025, Tier's annual fee is US$3,000, which is an administrative cost recovery; the Ministry of Commerce BIS does not have a "sales commission" system for permit application. What is common is whether permitted judgment and document procedures are required. These systems are very different from the "commissioning and commissioning". If the permit is combined with "sharing and acquisition", this is not only an export control, but also a function of financial income. This "use of permission to change the difference" approach requires clearer regulations, whether in terms of legal principles or policy levels.

It's not the first time I've invested, but this time it's not the same

The government's becoming an investor in an enterprise is not unprecedented. During the financial crisis in 2008, the U.S. Department of Finance approved a large number of high-level preferred shares and combined rights to the bank through the TARP "Capital Purchase Plan" (CPP), with the goal of stabilizing the system and withdrawing in the future; the restructuring of AIG in the same year also achieved significant impact through preferred shares and other loading devices. These investments are mostly dangerous arrangements that can stop bleeding and withdraw.

However, there are two key differences in the Intel case this year: in 2024, the US Department of Commerce announced the "highest" amount of funds and loans to Intel under the framework of the "Diamond and Science Act" to support its expansion in Arizona, Ohio, New Mexico and Oleston; the latest arrangement in August will convert the unissued subsidy into nearly 10% of the shares, which will increase the government to the largest shareholder and transform the government from "supporting person" into "shareholders".

The Intel case is not an emergency stopping of the financial hypertrophy system, but rather "reforming the CHIPS grant in 2024 into equity" and may be accompanied by terms of performance of manufacturing commitments; MP Materials is a supply chain policy-combining investment tool; U.S. Steel's gold stock is an extension of the external review.

Intel's document to the competent authorities mentioned that government shareholding may cause risks to foreign supervisors and customer relations, especially because its overseas revenue share is high, and the Chinese market has a visible proportion in the past; in addition, the exchange of government shares at discounted issuance directly affects the rights of existing shareholders - when the government is converted from a "sponsor" to a "shareholder", corporate governance preferential treatment becomes more sensitive.

In addition, in July 2025, the Pentagon announced that it would invest US$400 million to acquire MP Materials' real equity by converting preferred shares and rights, and combine price support and expansion financing to rebuild the rare earth supply chain; in the same month, the US government acquired the "gold stock" arrangement with the right to determine whether it was a part of the national security agreement.

The Financial Times describes this trend as the opening of the "standard national capitalism" and compares Intel's stake with other interventions, pointing out its impact on the stand-up of the Republican traditional free market; Huaer Street Journal reported that Intel The pull of relations with the government depicts the personnel and strategic pressures behind this transaction, even if Commerce Minister Lutnik stressed that this shareholding does not include voting rights, and the discussion has defined this incident as a reversal of policy style rather than a single case. These practices are different from each other, and they all point to the direction of "the government is more directly involved in corporate governance and business decisions", and may be closer to China's 1% gold stock practices by companies such as domestic enterprises, Weibo, Alibaba, and Teng.

Supporters and critics each take the lead

In the context of long-term political risks in the region, relying solely on supplementary and tax benefits is difficult to ensure that strategic industries are expanded and studying in the United States at the pace. Government shareholding, gold stocks or price support can turn "commitments" into "rights" and allow taxpayers to share upward returns. The media believes these approaches are moving towards "more aggressive industrial policies", and White House advisers also suggest that similar transactions will continue to occur.

But on the other hand, this is equivalent to directly implanting policy risks into corporate governance and valuation. Once the political situation is unstable, enterprises will also bear controllable governance uncertainty. As for NVIDIA’s 15% commission, if the essence is similar to export tax, will it encounter a "U.S. Shoe"-style cohesive challenge in the court? How can enterprises avoid the risk of collective lawsuits due to the payment mechanism while allowing policies?

If you look at it internationally, export taxes and ban restrictions are common: for example, Argentina has long imposed a high proportion of export tax on soybean products, Russia has imposed floating taxes on McGregor, India has 10% to 20% of export taxes on some rice courses from 2023 to 2024, and Indonesia will promote local smelting of gold with bans and allocations. These are policy tools explicitly stated by "tax or control"; while the United States does not take this route due to legal restrictions.. It is precisely because of this that the export permit and the "consumption and sharing" can be described as "unprecedented in history" and cause disagreements and doubts.

The "rationality" of the government extending its hands into the industry

To measure whether this policy is "reasonable", it should not only look at whether it "can save energy" or "can resist technical outflows" in the short term, but also whether the system can recover in time and space. If the NVIDIA 15% commission is promoted based on administrative permit conditions, it is necessary to clarify the source of the labeling, purpose and calculation method, and be related to the administrative cost. Otherwise, it will not stand the foot before the "Export Terms" and the "U.S. Shoe" jurisprudence. Whether special laws or explicit authorizations can be established at the legislative level of the Congress to determine the life of this order.

The TARP era's rights and dividend design once allowed taxpayers to share the benefits of banking business recovery; if the new generation of industrial policies want to contribute to the market, they must transparently explain how "public reply" quantifies the pathway and how to maintain public equity, and discusses the opening standards including rights, redemption, or specific research and development results. Historical experience shows that a clear, measured and withdrawable design can reduce the infringement of the market in the middle.

Intel case, even if converted to equity, the government should set clear exit paths and governance boundaries during the period, such as voting rights restrictions, non-controlling shareholder commitments, and withdrawal terms with performance-to-performance, to avoid political impact on corporate governance and the value of the enterprise itself. Otherwise, political cycles and choice changes will directly affect corporate strategies and investors' confidence.

Intervention can make it more clear

In the past, the United States relied on the rule of law and capital market efficiency to attract global funds, but now it has taken more direct ownership and balanced measures for national security and industry competition. The investment in Intel has transformed the government from a "sponsor" into a "shareholder", and NVIDIA took a 15% commission to turn exports into tools that bring financial effects. These methods are not considered bad: if they can be designed with clear legal sources, transparent terms and strict exits, and ensure that corporate governance is not affected by political cycles, they may become necessary tools in long-term political competitions.

On the contrary, if you quickly advance with trading thinking, ignore the conscience, manage firewalls and predictability, you will encounter double backlash in the court and the market. Can Trump's anti-traditional party policy be effectively managed and transformed into the trust of the electorate?

Extended reading: Support stock exchange, 15% to close: Trump's "businessman thinking" governs the country, hinders the semiconductor order NVIDIA and AMD China chip sales revenue was 15%, and the US export permit was exchanged The U.S. government has invested in Intel, and market worries may be further strengthened in private enterprises